Ideas from 'Consciousness' by William Lycan [1987], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Consciousness' by Lycan,William G. [MIT 1995,0-262-62096-0]].

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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory

6548	Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction

6531	Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens

6532	Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality

6534	One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy

7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories

6529	I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism

6549	I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality

6543	Intentionality comes in degrees

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

6537	Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

6546	Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction

6547	The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique

6527	If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws

6528	In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique

6554	Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?"

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism

6541	Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic

6545	If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism

6539	The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism

6535	Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones

6533	Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind

6544	Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind

6530	We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose

6536	Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

6542	A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes

6538	We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter

6551	'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time